



# I Hate Ransomware.

And, you should too!

John Strand




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# What We Are Covering

- Recent attacks
- Deception... Again.
- Beacons.... Again.
- Third type of ransomware
- Raccine
- Windows Settings



Explaining to a child  
that we're mortal  
and that death is  
inescapable is  
probably for me the  
hardest part of  
being a party clown.

No point of this.. I just  
miss Jack Handy on SNL.



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# Recent Attacks



## US passes emergency waiver over fuel pipeline cyber-attack

By Mary-Ann Russon  
Business reporter, BBC News

2 hours ago



COLONIAL PIPELINE

TECH CYBERSECURITY

## Hackers threaten to release DC police data in apparent ransomware attack

*It's the latest police department to be targeted*

By Jon Porter | @JonPorty | Apr 27, 2021, 8:46am EDT

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AD

**verge**  
**deals**

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# Cookies....



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# So... Deception.



- Let's hash this out
- Deception is no longer a "nice to have"
- Deception is no longer a "neat thing"
- It is core
- It is essential
- Fight me.



"Let's Dance!"




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# Word Docs!!!

- Word docs are great because we can put them on:
  - Shares
  - Compromised systems
  - Websites (Robots.txt)
  - Email to spammers!
- When an attacker pivots... Give them something



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# Yes! CanaryTokens!



## Canarytoken triggered

ALERT

An HTTP Canarytoken has been triggered by the Source IP 74.143.15.100.

### Basic Details:

Channel	HTTP
Time	2019-09-06 10:51:36
Canarytoken	qi5j8elwlge732y1nm0lnk1sn
Token Reminder	He opened it.
Token Type	ms_word
Source IP	74.143.15.100
User Agent	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; ms-office; MSOffice 16)

### Canarytoken Management Details:

Manage this Canarytoken [here](#)

More info on this token [here](#)




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# Not bad..



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
# But we can do better...



```
john@pop-os -> traceroute 74.143.15.100
traceroute to 74.143.15.100 (74.143.15.100), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  _gateway (192.168.43.92)  5.107 ms  5.111 ms  12.249 ms
 2  172.26.96.169 (172.26.96.169)  210.376 ms  210.438 ms  212.467 ms
 3  172.16.232.188 (172.16.232.188)  211.501 ms  211.482 ms  172.16.232.164 (172.
16.232.164)  211.555 ms
 4  12.249.2.9 (12.249.2.9)  211.472 ms  211.457 ms  211.435 ms
 5  12.83.188.242 (12.83.188.242)  211.350 ms  211.330 ms  211.310 ms
 6  cgcil21crs.ip.att.net (12.122.2.225)  211.204 ms  189.505 ms  189.489 ms
 7  cgcil403igs.ip.att.net (12.122.133.33)  189.511 ms  404.643 ms  404.581 ms
 8  be3039.ccr41.ord03.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.12.85)  378.582 ms  378.514 ms
378.491 ms
 9  38.142.66.210 (38.142.66.210)  378.477 ms  378.310 ms  378.403 ms
10  66.109.5.224 (66.109.5.224)  378.359 ms  378.292 ms  378.285 ms
11  bu-ether11.chctilwc00w-bcr00.tbone.rr.com (66.109.6.21)  378.231 ms  378.140
ms  66.109.5.137 (66.109.5.137)  378.268 ms
12  be2.clmkohpe01r.midwest.rr.com (107.14.17.253)  378.156 ms  be1.clmkohpe01r.m
idwest.rr.com (66.109.6.69)  378.201 ms  be2.clmkohpe01r.midwest.rr.com (107.14.1
7.253)  355.409 ms
13  be1.lsvmkyzo01r.midwest.rr.com (65.189.140.163)  376.686 ms  *  *
14  *  *  *
15  *  *  *
16  *  *  rrccs-74-142-115-130.central.biz.rr.com (74.142.115.130)  362.292 ms
17  rrccs-74-143-15-100.central.biz.rr.com (74.143.15.100)  367.971 ms  362.327 m
```



# Enhance



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# Applicability



- Attacker pops a box
- They try to pivot by finding docs with passwords in them
- They open a honeydoc
- You get an alert
- You shut them down
- You don't end up in the news
- Everyone likes that...
























"Let's Dance!"



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Name	Type	Description
 Abraham.Mccoy	Use	
 Admin ADM. Administrator	Use	
 Alberta.Armstrong	Use	
 Alberto.Patterson	Use	
 Alfredo.Perkins	Use	
 Allan.Reid	Use	
 Amos.Edwards	Use	
 Angela.Garner	Use	
 Angela.Hampton	Use	
 Angela.Knight	Use	
 Angelo.Richards	Use	
 Anthony.Caldwell	Use	
 Antoinette.Morrison	Use	
 Antonio.Garza	Use	
 Arlene.Poole	Use	
 Arturo.Abbott	Use	
 Becky.Wise	Use	
 ben arnold	Use	
 Bernadette.Crawford	Use	
 Bernice.Lawson	Use	
 Bertha.Schultz	Use	

Admin ADM. Administrator Properties

Member Of

Dial-in

Environment

Sessions

Remote control

Remote Desktop Services Profile

COM+

General


Address

Account

Profile

Telephones

Organization

 Admin ADM. Administrator

First name:

Initials:

Last name:

Display name:

Description:

Office:

Telephone number:

E-mail:

Web page:



adminadmin @Win.Lab

winlab\	adminadmin
---------	------------

Log On To...

A logo featuring two crossed baseball bats forming a diamond shape. Inside the top part of the diamond, it says "BIRMINGHAM JOURNAL". A yellow banner across the middle reads "CELEBRATING 10 YEARS". Below the banner, it says "• 2008-2018 •".





```
PS C:\tools> Invoke-LocalPasswordSpray -Password Winter2020
[*] Using C:\temp\UserList.txt as userlist to spray with
[*] Password spraying has started. Current time is 11:29 AM
[*] This might take a while depending on the total number of users
[*] SUCCESS! User:Christopher Password:Winter2020
[*] SUCCESS! User:Dennis Password:Winter2020
[*] SUCCESS! User:Gregory Password:Winter2020
[*] SUCCESS! User:Jack Password:Winter2020
[*] SUCCESS! User:Jerry Password:Winter2020
[*] SUCCESS! User:Michael Password:Winter2020
[*] Password spraying is complete
[*] Any passwords that were successfully sprayed have been output to C:\temp\sprayed-cre
PS C:\tools> |
```



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# Kerberoasting



-----Original Message-----

From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Subject: (High) Potential Kerberoasting Attack Detected.

This is a high priority alert, someone may be attempting to exploit Active Directory.

For more information on Kerberoasting see: <https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458> and <https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458>

TimeCreated

IpAddress

TargetUserName

TargetDomainName

ServiceName

ServiceSid

TicketOptions

TicketEncryptionType

MachineName



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# Applicability



- Attacker pops a box
- They try to pivot by password spraying or Kerberoasting
- You detect it immediately
- You shut them down
- Your CEO does not throw you under the bus before congress
- It was a good day.



"Let's Dance!"




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# Network Analysis



 MITRE | Shield

Matrix Tactics Techniques ATT&CK® Mapping Resources Blog

We have a blog! Check out [MITRE Shield on Medium](#).

Home &gt; Techniques

## Network Monitoring

Monitor network traffic in order to detect adversary activity.

Network monitoring involves capturing network activity data, including capturing of server, firewall, and other relevant logs. A defender can then review them or send them to a centralized collection location for further analysis.

### Details

ID: DTE0027

Tactics: [Detect](#), [Collect](#)

### Opportunities

ID	Description
DOS0198	There is an opportunity to monitor network traffic for different protocols, anomalous traffic patterns, transfer of data, etc. to determine the presence of an adversary.

### Use Cases

ID	Description
DUC0089	A defender can monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MITM behavior.
DUC0159	A defender can monitor for systems establishing connections using encapsulated protocols not commonly used together such as RDP tunneled over TCP.
DUC0198	The defender can implement network monitoring for and alert on anomalous traffic patterns, large or unexpected data transfers, and other activity that may reveal the presence of an adversary.



<https://www.activecountermeasures.com/free-tools/rita/>



DOWNLOAD

## REAL INTELLIGENCE THREAT ANALYTICS

RITA is an open source  
framework for network  
traffic analysis.

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This open source project, born from Black Hills Information Security, is now developed, funded and supported by Active Countermeasures.

The framework ingests Bro/Zeek Logs, and currently supports the following major features:

- ✓ Beaconing Detection: Search for signs of beaconing behavior in and out of your network
- ✓ DNS Tunneling Detection: Search for signs of DNS based covert channels



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# And now... A very special note from Chris Brenton.



Hey dude,

One data point you may want to convey tomorrow is that ransomware is skewing the dwell time numbers between initial compromise and detection. The sites that are reporting that we are getting better than 6 months at detection are including ransomware in their calculations. IMHO, that shouldn't count as it's the attacker revealing themselves, not an actual "detection". When you separate ransomware and APT, we're still at a 6-month dwell time for APT.

HTH,  
C



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# Ransomware of the third kind



## Law firm hackers threaten to release dirt on Trump

A new ransom demand of \$42m has been made against New York law firm Grubman, Shire, Meiselas and Sacks, and it may be the largest ever, say security experts



The cyber crim

# THIS MEANS SOMETHING



TECH CYBERSECURITY

## Hackers threaten to release DC police data in apparent ransomware attack

It's the latest police department to be targeted

By Jan Porter | @JanPorty | Apr 27, 2021, 8:46am EDT

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NEWS TRANSPORTATION • News

## VTA targeted in apparent ransomware attack, hackers threaten to release trove of data

Buses and light rail are still running, though many computer systems are offline



By NICO SAVIDGE | nsavidge@bayareanewsgroup.com | Bay Area News Group  
PUBLISHED: April 22, 2021 at 9:57 a.m. | UPDATED: April 23, 2021 at 11:08 a.m.

A group of hackers claims to have stolen a trove of data from the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority in an apparent ransomware attack that has paralyzed many of the agency's computer systems for days.

VTA officials initially said they believed they had contained the attack, which began over the weekend. But in a post on the dark web Thursday, a hacker group calling itself "Astro" wrote that it stole 150 gigabytes of data from the transit authority and is threatening to post it publicly if VTA does not "cooperate."

Brett Callow, a threat analyst with the cybersecurity firm Emsisoft, said hackers in ransomware attacks such as this one make copies of sensitive data on the networks of governments.

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
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# A quick note..



The power grid is a special security case. We need segmentation and to keep legacy systems running for years. If we don't do this correctly... People can die.



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# Another note..



Medical is a special security case. We need segmentation and to keep legacy systems running for years. If we don't do this correctly... People can die.



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
# Another note..



Financial is a special security case. We need segmentation and to keep legacy systems running for years. If we don't do this correctly... People can die.



# Another note..



CHESS  
POKER  
FIGHTER COMBAT  
GUERRILLA ENGAGEMENT  
DESERT WARFARE  
AIR-TO-GROUND ACTIONS  
THEATERWIDE TACTICAL WARFARE  
THEATERWIDE BIOTOXIC AND CHEMICAL WARFARE  
CARDS AGAINST HUMANITY  
GLOBAL THERMONUCLEAR WAR

solaris

Defense is a special security case. We need segmentation and to keep legacy systems running for years. If we don't do this correctly... People can die.




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# They are all correct..



- This needs to stop
- Belief that a market vertical is "unique" helps create excuses for not doing the "right" thing
- I know I am preaching to the choir
- One powerful question... "When?"



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# If we don't get it.. It's OK.



These folks will teach us the error of our ways.



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# Anndd....



These folks will "fix" the error of our ways....



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# Let's Think



"Think about how ransomware works  
Mark! THINK!"



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# Raccine



☰ README.md



# RACCINE

## Raccine

A Simple Ransomware Protection

## Why

We see ransomware delete all shadow copies using `vssadmin` pretty often. What if we could just intercept that request and kill the invoking process? Let's try to create a simple vaccine.



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# File and Folder Protection



## Ransomware protection in Windows Security

The **Ransomware protection** page in Windows Security has settings for both protecting against ransomware, and recovering if you happen to get attacked.

### Controlled folder access

Controlled folder access designates specific folders which only trusted apps are allowed to access. This prevents the contents of the folders from being changed, or encrypted, by malware such as ransomware.

Enable controlled folder access by turning it on with the toggle. By default key folders such as Windows system folders, your default documents and pictures folders, and others are automatically protected.

To add protected folders:

1. Go to **Start** ➤ **Settings** ⚙️ > **Update & Security** 🗑️ > **Windows Security** 🛡️, and then select **Virus & threat protection**.
2. Under **Virus & threat protection settings**, select **Manage settings**.
3. Under **Controlled folder access**, select **Manage Controlled folder access**.
4. Under **Controlled folder access**, select **Protected folders**.
5. Select **Add a protected folder** and follow the instructions to add folders.

You can add additional apps to the trusted list by selecting **Allow an app through Controlled folder access** then **Add an allowed app**.



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# One more thing...



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# Thanks!



- Thanks for hanging out
- John Strand
- @strandjs



Here is a bunny...  
Hope it makes up for the  
Government slide earlier...  
Sorry.



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# Questions?



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