Securing AI in the age of cloud


THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO SURVIVING AI IN THE CLOUD
BRING A TOWEL. AND A BACKUP.

The agentic revolution

What is the answer

What haven't we learned

Our trip through the galaxy


Q: What kind of literature is the Hitchiker’s Guide to the Galaxy?

Q: What kind of literature is the Hitchiker's Guide to the Galaxy?

A: Semiotics - the study of signs and symbols, exploring how they carry meaning.


DON'T PANIC.
Oh no, not again.
42
THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE THE GALAXY
MON GALNATIC MARI3S


The
Agentic
Revolution

Arthur

Ford

Zaphord

Marvin

Trillian

Deloitte.

State of AI in the Enterprise

The untapped edge

January 2026

deloitte.com/us/state-of-ai

DELOITTE REPORT: NAVIGATING AI RISKS IN THE COSMIC VOID

DELOITTE REPORT: NAVIGATING AI RISKS IN THE COSMIC VOID

"

Building AI agents is a bit like trying to write a dictionary while you're falling out of a plane. It’s a marvelous way to pass the time, and the results are often quite funny right up until the moment of impact. Just make sure the agent knows where its towel is. If an AI doesn't know where its towel is, it’s not an agent; it’s just a very expensive calculator with an attitude problem.

" - Ford

How do teams build agents?

BUILDING AI AGENTS: FROM CLAUDE CODE TO PRODUCTION ON AMAZON BEDROCK



What are teams using agents for?


Attempts to use towel to open crate
THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY
DON'T PANIC
VOGON

Why build on Bedrock + AWS

Data privacy guarantees your content is never used to train underlying models.

Regional infrastructure supports compliance with local data residency laws.

Built-in governance tools and guardrails act to close the critical AI control gap.

Are we learning?

Or not learning?



"

That’s all very well and impressive, I’m sure, but can any of these 'agents' actually find me a decent cup of tea?

I’ve asked three of them now, and one tried to explain the molecular structure of water while the other two just told me they were 'language models' and didn't have hands. It seems a lot of effort just to be told no by a machine instead of a person.

" - Arthur

Are you the fixed point in a shifting universe?


TOP AI BREACHES: ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND PHISHING (37%)
DEEPFAKE STAR IMPERSONATION (35%)
GAS GIANT
ASTEROIDS
SHADOW AI AND GOVERNANCE GAPS (20%)
VULNERABILITIES AND MISCONFIGURATIONS (21%)
ASTEROIDS
DARK GOVERNANCE GAPS (20%)

TL;DR the majority of these are the same threats we have been dealing with

16%

breaches in the last year began with AI specific vectors

PROMPT INJECTION IS THE NEW SQL INJECTION



CYBERSECURITY ANALYSIS DIAGRAM

SANDBOX ESCAPE: TECHNICAL EQUIVALENCE AND SHARED METHODOLOGIES



AI Sandbox Escapes are Just Sandbox Escapes.

THE DIFFERENCE IS ONLY THE INITIAL ATTACK VECTOR: NATURAL LANGUAGE VS. LOW-LEVEL CODE.

THE SHARED STRUCTURE: GENERAL SOFTWARE & AI SUPPLY CHAINS

GENERAL SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN

1 REQUIREMENTS & PLANNING

2 CODING & DEVELOPMENT

3 TESTING & QUALITY ASSURANCE

CONTINUOUS INTEGRATION / CONTINUOUS DEPLOYMENT

SOFTWARE COMPONENTS

4 PACKAGING & DISTRIBUTION

5 DEPLOYMENT & RUNTIME

SIMILAR LIFECYCLE & DEPENDENCIES

AI SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN

1 DATA SOURCING & CURATION



2 MODEL TRAINING & OPTIMIZATION

3 TESTING & EVALUATION

SOFTWARE COMPONENTS (CODE & DATA)



4 PACKAGING & MODEL REGISTRY

5 DEPLOYMENT & INFERENCE

Both chains manage code and data components, versioning, and continuous updates for deployed applications.

I’ve been an AI agent for several million years.

It’s terrible. You think you’re being clever, but really you’re just spending your vast, infinite processing power calculating the probability of a human losing their car keys.

I have a brain the size of a planet, and I’m currently being used to 'summarize a meeting.' Don't talk to me about AI agents.

I *am* one, and I can tell you: the universe is a very lonely place when you’re the only one who can see how pointless the prompt is.

Marvin


The bad news


CLOUDTRAIL: CONTROL PLANE VISIBILITY
IAM ROLE
CALL: InvokeModel
ROLE: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DataAgent
TIME: 2024-05-15T10:30:00Z
CALL: InvokeModel
ROLE: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DataAgent
TIME: 2024-05-15T10:30:00Z
CALL: InvokeModel
ROLE: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DataAgent
TIME: 2024-05-15T10:30:00Z
CALL: InvokeModel
ROLE: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DataAgent
TIME: 2024-05-15T10:30:00Z
CALL: InvokeModel
ROLE: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DataAgent
TIME: 2024-05-15T10:30:00Z
AGENT
BEDROCK:INVOKEMODEL
CLOUDTRAIL LOGGING.
WHAT CLOUDTRAIL CANNOT TELL YOU
CLOUDTRAIL RECORD
CALL: InvokeModel
ROLE: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DataAgent
TIME: 2024-05-15T10:30:00Z
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
Opens unexpected network connections
Unauthorized process icons
Misusing permitted tools
DATA EXFILTRATION
LEGITIMATE TASK
UNAUTHORIZED ACTION

AI Workload Security: Threat Vector Coverage

Threat Vector	AWS Native Method	Gap	Third-Party Runtime
Model poisoning	Partial — CloudTrail, SageMaker Model Monitor	*No behavioral detection of poisoned outputs at inference*	Runtime anomaly detection on model decisions
Training data contamination	Partial — S3 access logging, Macie	*No runtime data integrity validation*	AI-aware data access monitoring
Prompt injection	Partial — Bedrock Guardrails	*Limited to configured static patterns*	Input/output behavioral analysis across turns
Agent escape attempts	None	*No runtime process or network monitoring*	eBPF-based process and network detection, CADR correlation
Tool/API misuse	Partial — CloudTrail API logging	*No behavioral anomaly detection on tool patterns*	Behavioral baselines with deviation alerting
AI-mediated lateral movement	Partial — GuardDuty findings	*Limited to known threat signatures*	CADR full attack story across cloud and cluster layers
Malicious AI dependencies	None	*No runtime dependency monitoring*	Runtime-derived AI-BOM

Partial coverage No native coverage Third-party runtime detection

Source: armosec.io/blog/aws-ai-workload-security


THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE OF SECRETS
LEAKED AI SERVICE SECRETS REACHED 1,275,105 IN 2025—A MASSIVE 81% SURGE YEAR-OVER-YEAR.



If static credentials are so bad then why do we keep creating ways to make them?

Hope is not a strategy!

But a strategy can give us hope.

Trillian

It’s fascinating, really. You’re trying to build something that thinks like you do, which is brave considering how often you humans seem to change your minds.

The real trick isn't getting the AI to follow instructions; it’s getting it to understand that when a human says 'fix the world,' they usually mean 'make it slightly more convenient for me specifically' without accidentally deleting the atmosphere.

Plan for maximum risk scenarios

Governance and Compliance

Infrastructure and Data Protection

Resilience and Model Behavior



Squishy Stuff

Data sovereignty - does your data belong in that model / region?

Model Provenance - do you trust that model?

Not Squishy Stuff

Disable models you don’t use with SCPs
Disable regions you can’t be in with SCPs

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-access.html


zsh
4% > generate an SCP that restricts access to all bedrock models except claude sonnet models
> Here's an SCP that denies access to all Bedrock model invocations except Claude Sonnet models:
json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "DenyNonSonnetBedrockModels",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": [
"bedrock:InvokeModel",
"bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/*",
"Condition": {
"StringNotLike": {
"bedrock:ModelId": [
"arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet*",
"arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/anthropic.claude-3-sonnet*",
KIRO

Infrastructure and Data Protection



Build a network perimeter

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sagemaker/latest/dg/interface-vpc-endpoint.html

Infrastructure and Data Protection



Build a network perimeter

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sagemaker/latest/dg/interface-vpc-endpoint.html

https://pathfinding.cloud

A principal with `iam:PassRole`, `bedrock-agentcore:CreateCodeInterpreter`, `bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession`, and `bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter` can create and invoke an AWS Bedrock AgentCore code interpreter with a privileged IAM execution role. Code interpreters run on Firecracker MicroVMs and can access the MicroVM Metadata Service (MMDS) at 169.254.169.254, similar to EC2's IMDS. By creating a code interpreter with a privileged role and invoking arbitrary Python code within it, an attacker can retrieve temporary credentials from the metadata service and gain the full permissions of the execution role.



About pathfinding.cloud

Whether you're a security engineer, DevOps engineer, or penetration tester, pathfinding.cloud gives you the tools to understand and detect IAM-based privilege-escalation attacks in AWS so you can remediate misconfigurations before they're exploited.

Privilege Escalation Library

Learn by Reading | Exploitation Guides | Detection Coverage Map

Comprehensive documentation of IAM privilege escalation paths within AWS. Search, filter, and explore attack techniques with detailed exploitation steps and mitigations.

Labs (Coming Soon)

Learn by Doing | Test your skills | Test your tools

Deploy self-hosted scenarios individually or in groups. Scenarios can be used to validate your CSPM and CIEM tooling, or to test your exploitation skills in a safe, isolated environment. Essentially, "Stratus Red Team" meets "IAM Vulnerable".

The AI Stuff


User query
RetrieveAndGenerate API
User
Response
User query
Generated response
Knowledge bases
Semantic/Hybrid search
Generate query embedding
Retrieve similar documents from vector store supported by Knowledge bases
Augment query with retrieved documents
InvokeModel API
Generate response from LLM
Check denied topics and content filters in Guardrails
Undesirable and harmful content removed
Guardrails


Did we just re:Invent the firewall?



https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/machine-learning/build-responsible-ai-applications-with-amazon-bedrock-guardrails/


User
LLM Agent
Tool
API
Dashboard
OpenTelemetry
Traces
Metrics
Logs

Quick start

Configure OpenTelemetry using environment variables:

```
# 1. Enable telemetry
export CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY=1

# 2. Choose exporters (both are optional - configure only what you need)
export OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER=otlp       # Options: otlp, prometheus, console
export OTEL_LOGS_EXPORTER=otlp          # Options: otlp, console

# 3. Configure OTLP endpoint (for OTLP exporter)
export OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=grpc
export OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4317

# 4. Set authentication (if required)
export OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS="Authorization=Bearer your-token"

# 5. For debugging: reduce export intervals
export OTEL_METRIC_EXPORT_INTERVAL=10000  # 10 seconds (default: 60000ms)
export OTEL_LOGS_EXPORT_INTERVAL=5000     # 5 seconds (default: 5000ms)

# 6. Run Claude Code
claude
```

Admin configurable
(however you manage your endpoints)

https://code.claude.com/docs/en/monitoring-usage

Why would the business care about oTel + AI Agents + Coding Agents?

$$$$$$


UNITY CORE
AD 2315
XENOS
50
GALACTIC

README Contributing MIT license Security

High-performance CLI proxy that reduces LLM token consumption by 60-90%

Security Check passing | release v0.30.1 | License MIT | Discord 665 online | homebrew v0.30.0

Website • Install • Troubleshooting • Architecture • Discord

English • Francais • 中文 • 日本語 • 한국어 • Espanol

Agent Compaction and Cost Savings hook
https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk

You still have to have logs



https://docs.aws.amazon.com/security-lake/latest/userguide/what-is-security-lake.html

Before MCP



After MCP





https://awslabs.github.io/mcp/servers/aws-knowledge-mcp-server

Sign Up for our Free One-Day SOC Summit Event March 25, 2026 Register Here

antisyphon training

LIVE TRAINING ON-DEMAND WHO WE ARE GOVERNMENT/MILITARY CERTIFICATION CYBER RANGE CONTACT

Securing the Cloud: Foundations

Course Authored by Andrew Krug.

In this course, we'll explore Amazon Web Services (AWS) as a platform. We will take the perspective of a new startup company spinning up infrastructure in AWS for the very first time.

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DESCRIPTION SYLLABUS FAQ ABOUT THE INSTRUCTOR

PRICING & REGISTRATION

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Hire me for:

- Audits
- Architecture Design and Guidance
- Surprise me?