Deceptive-Auditing: An Active Directory Honeypots Tool
Deceptive-Auditing is a tool that deploys Active Directory honeypots and automatically enables auditing for those honeypots.
Deceptive-Auditing is a tool that deploys Active Directory honeypots and automatically enables auditing for those honeypots.
By Troy Wojewoda During a recent Breach Assessment engagement, BHIS discovered a highly stealthy and persistent intrusion technique utilized by a threat actor to maintain Command-and-Control (C2) within the client’s […]
Setting goals is a deceptively simple career skill we all know is important, but how do you set goals you’re actually excited to work towards?
What happens when you ditch the tiered ticket queues and replace them with collaboration, agility, and real-time response? In this interview, Hayden Covington takes us behind the scenes of the BHIS Security Operations Center, which is where analysts don’t escalate tickets, they solve them.
This is the third in a three-part series of blog posts discussing how to abuse Kerberos delegation! If you haven’t already, feel free to read the first blog post, as they discuss the Kerberos authentication process and how delegation plays an important role in solving the double-hop problem, and how to abuse unconstrained delegation.
This article was written to provide readers with an overview of a selection of our pentest results from the last 15 months. This data was gathered toward the end of September 2025. Shockingly, the data does not differ much from our prior analyses conducted at the end of 2022 or 2023.
This is the second in a three-part series of blog posts discussing how to abuse Kerberos delegation! If you haven’t already, feel free to read the first blog post, as it discusses the Kerberos authentication process and how delegation plays an important role in solving the double-hop problem.
In Active Directory exploitation, Kerberos delegation is easily among my top favorite vectors of abuse, and in the years I’ve been learning Kerberos exploitation, I’ve noticed that Impacket doesn’t get nearly as much coverage as tools like Rubeus or Mimikatz.
Imagine this: You’re an attacker ready to get their hands on valuable data that you can sell to afford going on a sweet vacation. You do your research, your recon, everything, ensuring that there’s no way this can go wrong. The day of the attack, you brew some coffee, crack your knuckles, and get started. A few hours into the service scan, you come to realize that all the network ports are open, but in use.